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From the time when the case of the Daughters of Zelophedad
was decided down to the present day, there has probably been
no system of law lacking provision for filling unforeseen gaps,
in order that unanticipated jural problems might be solved. In
the classic days of Roman law this was satisfactorily accom-
plished by means of the responsa prudentiuin. In the Middle
Ages this was attempted by the glossators and commentators.
In England it was at one time constitutional for judges to refer
knotty problems to parliament for final solution.
In more modern times the solution of such problems is left
to the courts wherein they arise. The only exception to this, of
which the writer is aware, is that of the old Prussian Code Fred-
6ric, which required the judges to report novel cases to the head
of the judicial department for decision by a legislative commis-
sion: in the Roman-Dutch system the judges were sworn "to fol-
low the path of reason according to their knowledge and discre-
tion." This requirement led to the "reception" of Roman law as
the common law of the Netherlands.1 It has been stated that
the French method of solving new questions in civil law is by
evolutionary interpretation. Louisiana has provided, in part,
that:
"In all civil matters where there is no express law the
judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity.
To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law
and reason or received usages where positive law is silent." 2
Spanish law ordains that:
"When there is no law exactly applicable to the point
in controversy the custom of the place shall be applied, and
in default thereof, the general principles of law." 3
1 I GROTIUS, JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND (Lee's translation, 1929) C. 2, § 22.
' LA. REV. Civ. CODE (Merrick's 3d ed. 1925), art. 21. Cf. Lord Mansfield's
identification of the principle ex aequo et bono with natural law and equity in
Moses v. Macfarlane, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012 (Eng. 176o).
'WALTON, CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH AMERIcA (i900) art. 6.
(950)
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Modem Japan fills gaps by a process of extensive interpretation.4
Argentine's rule is well worthy of attention for it is in effect
almost a codification of the Anglican rule for dealing with cases
lacking in precedent. It is as follows:
"If a civil question cannot be decided, either by the
words or the spirit of the law, the principles of analogous
laws shall be followed, and if the question should still remain
doubtful, it shall be settled according to the general prin-
ciples of law, taking into consideration the circumstances
of the case." 5
As a last resort the Austrian Civil Code directs judges to decide
cases "nach den natirlichen Grundsdtzen;" which is presumably
the concept of natural law presented in the Pandects as that which
arises ex aequo et bono. 7 An almost equally succinct provision
is that of Switzerland, viz., "'solutions consacries par la doctrine
et la jurisprudence." 8 In common law jurisdictions novel ques-
tions of law are frequently solved by avowedly or impliedly re-
sorting to the Anglican principle aequum et bonum est lex legurn,
foreshadowed in the us est ars boni et aequi,' of the Corpus Juris.
The general purport of the doctrine is focussed in the old-world
phrase "meet and right," of the Book of Common Prayer. Its
function is subsidiary to such a degree that it is seldom referred
to explicitly even where its force is felt in the determination of
a controversy, which may account for the paucity of references to
the phrase in works of reference. Some phrases consciously, in-
tuitively or half-consciously used as equivalents of the doctrine
are: "just and right"; 10 "reason and justice" ;"1 "good con-
'DE BCKER, CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN, INTRODUCTORY NOTE (I909), xxxi, xxxii.
5 ARGENTINE CIVIL CODE (Joannini's translation 1917) art. 715.
0 AUSTRIAN CIVIL CODE, art. 7. Cf. the opinion of Farwell, J., in Bradford
v. Ferrand, [1902] 2 Ch. 655, 662, in which the conception of aequum et bonum
is included in jus naturale.
JUSTINIAN, DIG., lib. I, tit. I, §§ io, II.
s Swiss CIVIL CODE, art. I.
'JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, lib. I, tit. I, pr.
10Davidson v. Allan, 213 Mo. 293, 300, III S. W. 1128, 1130 (1908).
City of Minneapolis v. St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 131, 140, 28
N. W. 3, 8 (1886) ; Crispe v. Perrit, Willes, 467, 473 (Eng. 1744) ; Barker v.
Lomax, Willes, 659, 662 (Eng. 1752).
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science" ;12 "plain justice and good faith";13 "equity in its
broadest and most generous sense"; 14 "prevailing equity and
justice"; 15 "equity and good conscience"; 16 and "right and jus-
tice". 17  Many derivative principles-even many branches of law
-are remotely attributable to this somewhat idealistic concept.
Among these may be mentioned the well-known principle of pub-
lic policy ex dolo malo non oritur actio; the obligation of good
faith in carrying out what is written; the doctrine of undue influ-
ence; the golden rule sic 'utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, said to
be the source of the police power ;18 the concept contra bonos
mores which, among other things, forbids marriage-broker con-
tracts; the doctrine of unjust enrichment in quasi-contracts; the
criminal law doctrine of mala in se; and even the pious fiction
underlying the policy of giving a tort remedy to victims of the
unauthorized acts of those entering under the protection of the
law, may all be traced back to the principle aequum et bonum. In
general "the common law will not halt or surrender because the
situation is novel . . . but will resort to some practical means
that will be just to both parties" to a controversy. 19 Although an
eminent continental scholar has described our common law sys-
tem as an ocean of cases, it is not to be forgotten that with us
principles are primary and precedents are secondary, the accepted
law consisting in its reason and policy more than in particular
instances and precedents.2 0 In the hierarchy of law aequum et
"Bailey v. Railroad Co., 22 Wall. 604, 638 (U. S. 1874).
'Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320, 342 (Eng. 1791).
"In re Curtis & Castle Arbitration, 64 Conn. 501, 512, 3o AtI. 769, 770
(1894).
Campbell v. Mesier, 4 John. Ch. 335 (N. Y. 182o).6 DILLON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE (1894) 19.
' Com. v. Hess, 148 Pa. 98, 23 Atl. 977 (892).
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
'Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 18o N. Y. 215, 231, 73 N. E. 7,
II (1905). Cf. ". . . the idea of the law is an eternal Becoming, but that
which has Been must yield to the new Becoming." VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE
FOR LAW (Lalor's translation, 2d ed. 1915) 13.
" Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536 (1843); Com. v. Hess. supra note 17;
Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 956 (Eng. 1703) ; Reg. v. Ramsey et al.,
15 Cox Cr. Cas. 231, 235 (Eng. 1883) ; Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfeldt Guns
& Ammunition Co. [18941 A. C. 535, 547, 553, 558; DnLON, 1c. Cit. supra note
16. Cf. DoMAT-Lois CIvILEs (1835) liv. pril, tit. i, § 2.
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bonum is a subsidiary principle which frequently yields to con-
ventional and positive rules, certainty being regarded as equality
when it comes to the application of fixed rules of law. Where,
however, the doctrine forms part of the ratio legis it carries con-
siderable weight as was shown by Shaw, C. J., in the case of
Jones v. Robbins,21 when he pointed out that most of the rules
laid down in Bills of Rights:
. . .are so obviously dictated by natural justice and com-
mon sense, and would be so plainly obligatory upon the con-
sciences of legislatures and judges, without any express
declaration, that some of the state constitutions, and even
the convention which framed the Constitution of the United
States, did not originally prefix a declaration of rights."
Some of the limitations of the rule aequum et bonum est le.x legum
have been defined by Vattel who says:
. .. it is even necessary at times to deviate from natural
justice, in order to prevent fraud and adapt the law to cir-
cumstances, and since the sense of duty is so often lacking in
mankind, it is requisite that laws be given a penal sanction in
order that they may be efficient." 22
Again, it is submitted that the law leans toward liberty until
experience shows a course of conduct to be fraught with mis-
chievous or anti-social consequences. This may be" observed in
judicial restatement of law. As an illustration, the change of
policy from the old rather cynical rule of caveat emptor, which
assumed that vendors "would stretch the truth", and purchasers
would be skeptical, to the modern implied warranty of quality and
the present-day implied contract of good faith, may be referred
to. At the same time it must not be overlooked that improved
standards of commercial honesty and general morality have been
a potent factor in this improvement of the law.
The leaning toward conceptions of liberty has sometimes
resulted in unsatisfactory decisions in regard to the constitutional-
'8 Gray 329, 240 (Mass. 1857).
2 I VAr'TEL, LE DRoIT DES Ga, s ou PRINCiPES DE LA Loi NATuRE,E (1916)
c. 13, § 159.
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ity of regulatory legislation; but usually such cases are subse-
quently overruled by a process of "reasoning from life", in lieu
of the prior reasoning from abstract conception. It is not always
easy to strike a golden mean between anarchical laissez-faire and
tyrannical verboten.
For a long time reciprocal obligations such as contracts, pur-
chase and sale, letting and hiring, partnership and agency, have
been deemed to be governed by principles ex aequo et bono.23 In
the Year Book era such principles were often termed the law of
nature. Thus we find Yelverton, J., speaking of "ley de nature que
est ground de touts leys." 24 Grotius says, "The law of nature is
a dictate of right reason" ; 25 and we find a survival of the idea of
natural law in an opinion of Mr. Justice Farwell, in which he
identifies that which is aequum et bonum with jus natura.
26
I say survival, for many writers deny the existence of such a
principle as natural law. However this may be, it must be ob-
served that where common law courts refuse to enforce a right
claimed under foreign law they often resort to a short-cut state-
ment that the right asserted is not warranted by the law of na-
ture.27  Those who dislike the term law of nature may prefer
the terminology of Richard Hooker, who says:
"Law rational . . .which men commonly use to call
the Law of Nature, meaning thereby the Law which human
Nature knoweth itself in reason universally bound unto,
which also for that cause may be termed most fitly the Law
of Reason." 28
Saint-Germain takes a similar position when he treats "Of the law
of reason, the which by doctors is called the law of nature of rea-
sonable creatures." 29 Chancellor Kent defined the law of nature
as:
2 GAius, INST. §§ 135, 137.
I Y. B. 8 ED. IV, f. 12 (456).
I GROTnus, DE JuRE BmLzt ET PAcis (1853) c. I. par. io, § I.
'Bradford Corporation v. Ferrand, 86 L. T. 497 (902).
' E. g., Forbes v. Cochrane, 2 B. & C. 448, 461, 462, 471 (Eng. 1824).
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY, lib. I, viii, 9.
' SAINT-GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (1721) C. 2.
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". . .those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator
has prescribed to man as a dependent and social being, and
which are to be ascertained from the deductions of right
reason." 30
Aquinas anticipated Blackstone by ascertaining that "law is noth-
ing but the dictate of reason . . . [it] is a function of reason." 'I
In more modern times Mr. Justice Cobb, in the course of recog-
nizing a right of privacy, averred that:
. .. the absence of a precedent for an asserted right .
even for all time, is not conclusive as to the existence of the
right . . . In such a case although there can be no precedent,
the common law will judge according to the law of nature
and the public good." 32
(The learned judge then proceeded to adopt the reasoning of a
dissenting opinion in the case of Roberson v. Box Co.33)
A few generations ago it was the fashion to attribute the ex-
istence of established principles of right and justice to a supposed
"social compact" ;34 but modern scientific investigations have led
to a tacit abandonment of any notion of "social compact". A
fashionable present-day designation of the common law is judge-
made law-a notion which leans towards acceptance of the French
jocosity "le superstitution de cas". If this designation of our law
be correct, and it must be conceded that it has very powerful sup-
porters, then the very concept of the word "judge" is false to its
etymology which signifies "lawsayer"-a meaning which is crys-
tallized in Bacon's maxim, jus dicere et non ijus dare. It is sub-
mitted that the neat phrase of the late Mr. Carter, which was
"law-finder", is a sound statement of the Constitutional function
of a common-law judge, and that judicial custom is to declare,
Wightman v. Wightman, 4 John. Ch. 343, 349 (N. Y. 182o).
3 1 AEQUINAS, ETHics I-II, q. 91.
Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. I9o, 5o S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A.
101 (1904).
171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (19o2).
Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 225 (1822) ; University of Maryland v.
Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, 408 (Md. 1838).
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rather than make law. A decision may become no more than the
law of the case. Its future fAte may be to be overruled, ignored
or overlooked, explained or distinguished. It may solve a puzzle
which had previously given rise to groping or unsatisfactory opin-
ions; or, as occasionally happens, its ratio decidendi may neces-
sarily involve the formulation of a series of rules. It may even
sweep away for all time a number of precedents and rules found
to be contrary to principle, as in the case of Ornychund v.
Barker 3' in which Chief Justice Willes cited Acts 10, 34 as better
authority than Coke in a ruling as to the validity of the oath of
a non-Christian. Such action as that of Chief Justice Willes
arises under very exceptional circumstances, for, as Mr. Allen has
pointed out, no matter how much he may wish to do so, no judge
has the power to sweep away what he believes to be the prevailing
rule of law and substitute something else in its place. 36 As a rule,
Anglican law does not pay much deference to the civil law as such,
but it frequently resorts to its use in cases where its determina-
tions are deemed equitable or closely analogous to the local law, in
which event it is naturalized or assimilated. This is noticeably
the case where the principle of our law is the same as that of the
civil lawY7  The attitude of the common law toward a "recep-
tion" of the civil law was voiced half a millenium ago, by a reso-
lution of Parliament: "Que ce royaline d'Angleterre n'estait de-
devant ces heures, ne a F'entent du roy nostre dit seignior et seign-
ors du parlement unque ne serra rulg ne govern6 par le ley".38
This sturdy self-reliance has not dwindled into a parochial self-
sufficiency as any one may observe when reading Mansfield, Kent,
Storey and Blackburn. As a matter of fact many principles are
identical in both systems, such as the maxim, "He who is first in
time is first in right"; 39 "A man's house is his castle"; 40 res
i Atk. 2i, 44 (Eng. 1744).
'ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (1927) 173.
Kennedy v. Panama, etc. Mail Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 579, 588 (1867).
'Rot. Parl. ii Ric. II (1388) (Selden's Note to Fortescue de Laud. Legg
Angliz, c. xxxiii.
CLAPx, EQuITy (1919) § 28.
o JusTrmAN, DiGEsT, lib. II, tit. 4, § I8.
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judicata; 41 habeas corpus; 42 the doctrines of gifts inter vivos,4 3
and gifts mortis causa,44 and the law of alluvion.4 5
It is a truism, overlooked, as are many other common-place
expressions, that much of the phraseology of the common law
is not to be taken literally, since it is in this respect in marked
contrast with the terminology of pure mathematics. In a meas-
ure this is true of other legal systems, as may be illustrated
by the workings of the cosmopolitan principles cessante ratione
legis, cessat ipsa lex, and de minimis non curat lex'. The principle
aequum et bonum est le% legum is no exception. It is not always
the law of laws or a law about laws. Sometimes that function
is supplied by the principle of necessity, and frequently ideal jus-
tice yields to public convenience or "that unruly horse"-public
policy. Nevertheless, the doctrine is of incalculable value, and so
frequently resorted to, in fact if not in form, that much of our
law is substantially identical with that of alien systems, especially
in the field of commercial law. The mischief involved in at-
tempted definitions was recognized as far back as the days of
Tribonian.4 6 Hence it is often requisite and necessary that a
general proposition of law be stated in a variety of forms. It is
conceived that no further apology is necessary for referring to
two cases, one English and the other Canadian, in which the sub-
ject of these notes has been stated in a negative form. The Eng-
lish case just alluded to is Emmens v. Pottle,4 7 in which it was
decided that the vendor of a newspaper is not answerable for a
libel contained in the publication of which he is an innocent dis-
seminator for the reason that:
"The question does not depend on any statute, but on the
common law, and any proposition the result of which would
be to shew that the Common Law of England is wholly
JUSTINIAN, DIGEST, lib. II, tit. 4, § 88.
"Ibid., lib. XXXXIII, tit. 29, § I.
'JUSTINIAN, INST., lib. II, tit. VII, § 2.
"'Ibid. § ii.
IIbid. tit I, § 2o.
"Ovn'is definitio in lege perculosa.-JusTiNiAN, DIGEsT, lib. 50, tit. 17,
§ 202.
4 I6 Q. B. D. 354 (1885).
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unreasonable and unjust, cannot be part of the Common
Law of England."
The Canadian case of Reynolds v. Crawford,4" laid down the
principle that before a plaintiff can succeed in an action for
money had and received "he must show that ex aequo et bono
the defendant should not retain it." Some twenty years later
the same court in passing upon a question of the return of an
excess payment stated the rule in an affirmative form, viz.: "
in the absence of direct authority [we] must hold . . . in
accordance with what we take to be the dictates of reason, justice
and equity"."
In the solution of non-statutory questions of law where there
happens to be no local precedent, resort is had in many instances
to suggestions or solutions contained in various sources. One of
these is the opinions of learned men such as are contained in the
writings of Storey, Pothier, and the collated opinions in the Di-
gest of Justinian. Another source is found in the decisions of
courts of law of cognate systems. A more copious source than
is often realized is foreign statute law. Thus Chief Justice Tilgh-
man, in the case of Clark v. Sanderson,5" upon considerations of
practical justice and reasonable certainty adopted and extended
a rule laid down in the Act of George III ;51 and in like manner
Chief Justice Shaw, in the course of ruling that a witness is
bound to answer a question pertinent to the issue where his answer
will not subject himself to penalty or forfeiture, or expose him to
criminal prosecution,5 2 attached great weight to another statute
of George III," "as strictly a declaratory law". Such foreign
elements, so far as adopted by judicial usage, become leges non
scriptae, as Blackstone has observed with conscision. Occa-
sionally in the decision of a case a court will supplement local
authority by way of illustration in availing itself of "the little
12 U. C. Q. B. 168, 174 (1854).
'Wilson v. Mason, 38 U. C. Q. B. 14, 30 (1876).
603 Binn. 192 (Pa. 181o).
n 25 & 26 Geo. III, c. 47, § 38 (1786).
"Bull v. Loveland, 27 Mass. 9, 13 (1830).
"46 Geo. III, C. 37 (18o6).
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more and how much it is", of foreign law. An outstanding ex-
ample of this is the case of St. Clair v. Livingstone,54 where Mr.
Justice Swayne, in clarifying that important derivative of the
principle de minimis non curat lex, the doctrine of alluvion, drew
upon the Institutes and Digest of Justinian, the Code Napoleon
and Las Siete Partidas in addition to Blackstone, Bracton, Hale
and Kent. Lord Holt's use of the Corpus Juris in the redaction
of the law of bailments in the leading case of Coggs v. Bernard,5
has been discussed by many writers. An unprecedented question
involved in the pledge of a flock of sheep has been set at rest by
drawing upon a passage in Domat. 6 On grounds of "justice
and equity", a New York court approved of an important rule laid
down in Domat, and held that one whose property is carried upon
the land of another without fault or negligence, as in the case of
a flood, may elect either to abandon the property, in which case
he is not liable to the owner of such lands for any injury occa-
sioned by it; or to reclaim it, in which later case he must com-
pensate such owner for the damages so occasioned. 57 A surety
has been granted an equitable defence on the strength of a pas-
sage in Justinian's Digest.58 Justice Blackburn after observing
that "though the Civil law is not of itself authority in an English
court, it affords great assistance in investigating the principles on
which the law is grounded", adopted the principle of obligatio de
certo corpore discussed in the Digest and Pothier, by holding that
there is an implied condition in contracts that the parties shall be
excused where, before breach thereof, performance becomes im-
possible from the perishing of some specific thing without default
of the contractor.59  A few years later the same judge cited
passages from the Roman law for the reason that "the principle
of our law is the same as that of the civil law", in formulating
the rule that a party might rescind a contract, even for an inno-
cent misrepresentation, where there is a complete difference be-
U 23 Wall. 48 (U. S. 1874).
2 Ld. Raym. 909, 912 (Eng. 1703).
Cahoon v. Miers, 67 Md. 573, II Atl. 278 (1887).
Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484, 487, 488 (187o).
Bechervaise v. Lewis, L. R. 7 C. P. 372 (1872).
32 L. J. C. L. (x¢. s.) 164, 166 (1863).
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tween the thing bargained for and the thing obtained, so as to
constitute a failure of consideration. ° Chief Justice Lee, cited
Domat on a question of partnership law "not as authority .
but as the opinions of learned men". 0' Justice Best in the case
of Cox v. Troy,6 2 was more positive, for in deciding the legal
effect of the obliteration of an acceptance he said, ". . . the
authority of Pothier is expressly in point. That is as high as
can be had, next to the decision of a court of justice in this coun-
try". Chancellor Kent, in Campbell v. Mesier,63 drew upon the
Digest, Voet, Pothier and the customs of Paris and Orleans and
recognized the doctrine of contribution as to party-walls, holding
that such a doctrine "falls within the reason and equity of the
doctrine of contribution which exists in the common law; and is
bottomed and fixed on general principles of justice". An unequivo-
cal recognition of aequum et bonum as lex legum. The leading case
of Young v. Grote,14 which holds that the drawer of a check is
liable where his negligence in drawing it has enabled a forger to
raise it, was based upon a passage in Pothier's, Contrat du Change.
The principle that bees which swarm upon a tree are not private
property until hived has been supported by a citation of Inst. 2. I.
14 in the case of M'Nutt v. Johnson.6 5 Even the realm of pro-
fane literature has been scanned for useful material, as in the case
of Millar v. Taylor,"6 where Milton was cited in determining a
question of literary property. At very wide intervals the reports
contain decisions in which a novel rule is excogitated from prin-
ciples of justice where no precedent domestic or foreign can be
found. An interesting illustration of this is presented by the
decision of Lord Ellenborough in the case of Rex v. Fisheryo6
'Kennedy v. Panama etc. Mail Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 579 (1867). Cf. CODE
NAPOLEON, art. IIIO: "A mistake does not make the contract void unless it is
one that affects the fundamental object of the contract."
Ryall v. Rowles, i Ves. Sr. 348, 369 (Eng. 1749).
62 5 B. & Aid. 474, 480 (Eng. 1822).
4 John. Ch. 334, 337, 339, 340 (N. Y. 182o).
4 Bing. 253 (Eng. 1827). Accord: London Joint Stock Bank. v. McMillan
and Arthur [1918] A. C. 777.
'7 Johns. 16 (N. Y. 181o).
4 Burr. 2303 (Eng. 1769).
072 Campb. 563, 570 (Eng. 1811).
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where he held it to be criminal libel to publish the preliminary
examinations taken ex parte before a magistrate previous to com-
mitting a man for trial or holding him to bail, for the reason that:
"The publication of . . preliminary examinations
has a tendency to pervert the public mind, and to disturb the
cause of justice, and . . is therefore illegal".
As has been well stated by Lord Stowell:
"All law is resolvable into general principles. The cases
which may arise under new combinations of circumstances,
leading to an extended application of principles, ancient and
recognized, by just corollaries, may be infinite; but so long
as the continuity of the original and established principles is
preserved pure and unbroken, the practice is never new, nor
is it justly chargeable with being an innovation on the ancient
law; when in fact, the court does nothing more than apply
old principles to new circumstances". 6 s
Among these principles is to be reckoned the ancient rule,
aequum et bonum est lex legum; although seldom alluded to by
name it has an appreciable influence in modem law, for:
"In determining a case with no precedent in the juris-
diction as a guide a court will adopt that rule which in its
opinion best accords with the habits and customs of the
people, and which will in the majority of cases be conducive
to a determination of controversy in accordance with jus-
tice". 69
The Atlanta, 6 C. Rob. 44o, 458 (Eng. 18o8).
'Wicker v. Jones, 159 N. C. 102, 74 S. E. 8oi (1912).
